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A NIGHT IN DECEMBER
by H. Peter Kuiper
NARRATOR: The rain has waned, and now the streets are clean and waiting.
But only the wind is coming.
Ihe last lingering leaves have larghettoed down, 
and now in the wind the trees are bowing and creaking 
like a man embarrassed and beaten, 
like an old man exposing his bones.
The sun shines once more 
and sizzles into the sea.
The city turns on its lights, 
and goes home to play:
"With popcorn and tinsel and candles so brigKt,
We shall be happy, it’s Christmas tonight."
It is a thoughtful city:
the stockings are hung by the chimney with care.
And now in the streets only the aimless, the raging, the wounded are walking.
Is it for them the streets are clean, and waiting?
I do not know.
I only 
listen:
ODD MAN ON CRUTCHES: Christmas Eve. 0 little town of Bethlehem,
How still we see... Doggone. Where have all the young men gone... Try to remember the time in December 
When nights were warm, and love...Love I What a laugh.
How long has it been now. Lemme see. Oh well, why bother.
Doggone, it’s cold tonight. Guess it has to be, though, since it*s 
Christmas Eve. If it wasn’t cold, they wouldn’t need fireplaces, and they gotta have those for the stockings. Hahi 
The trouble with people is that they just don’t care.
Try to remember the night in December...
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Hey, buddy, gotta dime for, say friend, It's Christmas eve, ya 
gotta quarter for a cup a coffee?
WELL-DRESSED MAN: Well, my good man, you know there are places where 
you can go and get warm and be fed and have coffee and find a nice 
bed, you know,that don't you? There are places which exist just to 
.take care of people like, I mean people with difficulties. Surely 
my good man, you' understand, I must hurry home to my family, it 's 
Christmas Eve, you know.
OLD MAN: Yea, I know.
WELL-DRESSED MAN: I'm sure you would. Now just walk down a few 
blocks, down by the business section, I'm sure an officer can tell 
you where it is, it's not hard to find, I've heard about It. Merry 
Christmas, now.
NARRATOR; So the well-dressed man hurried off to his car, and as he 
drove he thought about how clean the streets were, and how it gives 
one a good feeling to do a good deed, even if it's a small matter 
like giving an old man directions. ’’Nothing like a good clean 
feeling to help you celebrate Christmas," he said to himself as he 
turned up the heater of his car.
The man with the crutches walked on, but now he wasn't singing.
His armpits were beginning to hurt, and his hands were aching from 
clutching his crutches.: A whistle of a distant train Reminded him 
of his accident seven years before, and, as always when he thought 
of his leg, he cast a grateful glance to heaven for saving his 
live. "Not very smart to argue with a train," he told himself for 
the thousandth time. But as the whistle died away to be4 replaced 
in his awareness by the sounds of laughter and singing coming from 
homes along his way, he wondered if he shouldn't have argued with 
greater force. He wanted to rest, but there was no place to sit 
down.
After he had gone a couple of blocks he came to a church. It was 
a grand old building, with a huge stained glass window. The 
crippled man thought to himself, "I'm an old man, and this Is an 
old church, I'm 3ure I could rest here on the steps awhile. I've 
.never harmed a church In my life. "
So there he rested, and looked up. at the stained glass window. It 
was circular, and as the old man followed it around (it was lighted 
from Inside) he realized that it told a story. There was the 
■ birthscene, the manger. Then there was Jesus sitting on a hill­
side, teaching a crowd of people. This was followed by a picture 
of Jesus before Pilate, wearing a crown of thorns. Last, there was 
the scene of Christ ascending into heaven. .In the center of the 
window there was a cross. .
As the old man looked at the cross he realized that something was 
wrong: at the point where the two boards' of the cross were ■ supposed 
to meet there was a hole. Someone had thrown a rock through the 
window at thi3 point. CONTINUED ON PAGE 3
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Then, as the old man watched, a small bird flew out of the hole 
and Into the darkness. The man shuddered, and said to himself,
"I'd better shove on. Not even a church is safe here."
Shortly after he started walking, the old man realized that some­
one had overtaken him. He turned, and saw at his side a very old 
woman. She smiled at him, but said nothing. She simply slowed to 
his pace, and kept smiling, as if she had something too big for 
her little mouth to say. When they came to the corner, she sat 
down on the bench by a bus stop.
The old man thought: "She isn't very safe here all alone. I'd 
better sit here with her until the bus comes." Then, as he sat 
down beside her, he said, as though he had known her for a long 
time. "Pretty cold tonight. "
OLD WOMAN: "Yes, but it was warm in the church, where I just came 
from, and oh, it was lovely. They gave a Christmas play tonight. 
Afterwards I went up and sat in the balcony, and looked at the 
window. It’s a shame what happened to it, but it's still beautiful."
OLD MAN: "Yes, I know."
NARRATOR: In a short while the bus came, and the old man was sad 
because he knew that he could not stay with the old woman, and sad 
because he couldn't enjoy the rest and comfort of the bus when his 
hands and his foot were sore from walking. The bus hard a sign 
saying "End of Line" and the old man would gladly have ridden to 
the end of the line, wherever it was, to be able to sit next to 
the old woman and enjoy the rest and warmth of the bus.
The old woman had boarded the bus now. But the bus was^not moving. 
The old man was standing at the open door, like a camera on a 
tripod, trying to focus on a warm and vanishing dream. The driver 
looked at him for a tall minute. Then he said,
BUS DRIVER: "C'mon buddy, Christmas Eve. No charge on the End of 
the Line bus for cripples on Christmas Eve."
NARRATOR: The bus driver then pulled the hand brake, and went down 
and helped the old man into the bus. After they were both seated, 
the old woman went on with her story.
OLD WOMAN: "As I sat there, looking at the window of the church, my 
mind wandered back to the time many years ago when we had put on a 
Christmas play in church. It was called, "No Room In the Inn."
I played the part of the innkeeper’s wife. I was the one who per­
suaded him to make Mary and Joseph stay in the manger. Ever since 
that time I've felt kind of guilty everytime I think about it. I 
know I shouldn't feel that way, because I was only acting a part.
But I do. However, the longer I looked at the window, tonight, 
the better I felt. You saw the window, didn't you? Do you know what I mean?"
OLD MAN: "Yes, I saw it. But I don't understand It. I don't under­
stand why someone had to put a hole in it. I don't understand a 
lot of things. Take my leg, for example. I was trying to get on this train in Oklahoma City, just seven years ago tonight. Going
CONTINUED ON PAGE 4
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to go home to St. Louis and visit my family. But I slipped. Took 
my leg right off. I don’t know much about God, but I know that 
Someone spared my life. -Never'could understand why, though, after 
all I ’ve done. After the accident I had a lot harder time finding 
work. Before I liked to travel, never liked to stay in one place 
long, got restless. But now I have to travel. Hard to find work.
"Never could figure out why He spared my life. But every once and 
a while a song comes, or a person to talk to. And at night, often, 
there are dreams. But I don’t understand it. I just can’t under­
stand it. "
NARRATOR: They rode on then, for some time in silence. There were 
tears in the old woman’s eyes, but the old man was strong. They 
passed many houses brightly decorated with Christmas lights, and 
then in the business section there were lights and wreaths and 
Santa Clauses.
Finally the silence was broken by the bus driver: "End of the 
line. Merry Christmas. The old woman helped the old man move 
clumsily to the door, where the driver helped him down.
OLD MAN: "Thank you, thank you. Say, can you direct me to the 
rescue... "
OLD WOMAN (cutting him off): "I can. Come with me. It’s - 
Christmas."
NARRATOR: The old man looked at her. And as he looked at her he 
realized that he had been given a new night to remember, a night 
when the stars were nearer and warmer, a night he’d never forget. 
And from that knowledge, as if from a well buried deep inside him, 
there arose the awareness of why he was alive. Then softly, warmly 
he let his weathered voice sing:
OLD MAN: "Away in a manger, no crib for his bed
The little Lord Jesus lay down his sweet head;
The stars in the sky looked down where he lay,






AGAINST ACTIVISMby James W. Brown
One of the most curious of the phenomena characteristic of Puller 
is the evident embarrassment caused by its reputation for academic 
excellence. There is considerable pressure from my fellow students 
to make these years at Puller years of activism rather ^an years of 
Intense academic preparation. This pressure manifests itseirin many 
different ways: criticism of the seminary for not emphasizing de-
vottonal activities to a greater extent; jfor not being more actively and personally Involved ™ith the students^ 
great involvement of students in extra-curricular activity of a Chris 
tian, social, or cultural sort; and, a not unexpected bitter complaint that the academic load is too heavy or .the langua0
requirements^too ^  Morale of the students and faculty is
ly disturbed that the whole matter should be aired and we should de­
fine the purpose of a theological seminary such as Puller and then 
strive toward that goal with a singularity of purpose.
I. THE PURPOSE OF A THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
Trade School? "Trade school mentality" is, perhaps, an unkind epithet 
to fling about, but I suspect that it would be accepted almos ^
siastically as a Fuller Seminary slogan by many who are enroll . 
are here to learn a trade, it is true. We must learn here8ical mechanics behind a successful church program. But we are here 
primarily to study the theory and ground of such thingSSlMat least 
«practics' and more important, theology irL depth. Th r 4-hpnioe:I- two things about "trade school mentality^that cheat us asctheologl 
cal students: l) it inspires courses that penetrate very 11. 
deeper than the average pastor in the institutional Church need 
keep his «machine' running, robbing us of the kind of ^eractio 
with creative thinkers that might enable us to adygn?e l lllerpresent state; 2) It seems to encourage activism that f*nda 
students running hither and yon doing everything but M j W |  anything— not even . »practics « or homiletics, let alone m B m m m  
language, or (pardon) theology and its relation to ou 
depth.
There is nothing in the stated "Philosophy 
encourage activity which might compromise
academic productivity. In fact the thinking of the said rather, "If there is any place where academic mediocrity should 
be forthrightly resisted, it Is In a theological seminary. To giye 
God less than our best is a plain insult. The Fuller catalogue say , God less man our g H  self-grounded justification, and can lay claim
studied in its own right....Christianity necessarily 
implies theology. The question is not whether there is to be theol­
ogy; it is what kind of theology there will 6°
* * * * *
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graduated from Puller anything but a bungling mishandler of the basic 
tools of a Biblical theologian, he must dedicate himself to thousands 
of hours of labor In his study. If he wants to relate intelligently 
what he has learned to the domestic or foreign culture in which he 
has chosen to serve, he must surely nearly double that time of study.
In Ionesco's Absurdist drama »The Bald Soprano* a highly satiri­
cal dialogue takes place:
Fire Chief: Shall I tell you some stories?
Mrs. Smith: Oh, by all means, how charming of you.
Mr. Smith, Mrs. Martin, Mr, Martin: Yes, yes, some stories, hurrah l 
(They applaud.)
Mr. Smith: And what Is even more interesting Is the fact that the 
firemen's stories are all true, and they're based on experience. 
Fire Chief: I speak from my own experience. Truth, nothing but the 
truth. No fiction.
Mr. Martin: That's right. Truth is never found In books, only in 
life.
Mrs. Smith: Begin 1
How many at Fuller Seminary imply as much 1 The fact is that one can 
be saved many blunders in experience if one has prepared himself to 
be a knowledgeable gentleman before he enters the activity of his 
ministry.The biographies of great English and American ministers with 
which I am familiar provide example after example of young men who 
disciplined themselves in their youth to obtain an intellectual prep­
aration which is quite beyond the Ideal of anyone I know currently 
studying at Fuller. I cannot escape the feeling that our judgement 
will be severe and our ministries less than they could have been if 
we waste part of the time in these once-offerred years of preparation 
by staffing local churches, demonstrating too frequently 6ur social 
concern, and over-indulging ourselves socially and culturally.iii.Cannot both academic excellence and activism be emphasized at Fuller? 
To me the tension between these two poles is much like that between 
'God and mammon* in that it is difficult to get submerged in both at 
the same time. I feel that both might have a place at Fuller with 
proper scheduling, as I shall point out below, but the present system 
of pressure for activism while at the same time mastering academic 
disciplines is a poor method.
II. SOME MODEST PROPOSALS:
i.The first proposal that I would suggest Is that the seminary de­
mand a limitation of extra-curricular student activity. This pro­
posal is most seriously an indictment against the Seminary and evan­
gelical Christianity for failure to properly care for its seminarians. 
The recent Faculty Lectureship Series by Professor Schnackenburg 
affords a telling Illustration. These stimulating lectures were very 
poorly attended by our seminarians. At an evening seminar in Biblical 
Theology following the Lectureship, Dr. Ladd asked the students why 
so few had attended. The answer was appalling. A great number who 
would have attended were forced to absent themselves because they had 
to work at secular odd jobs'. These students, the hope of Evangelical­
ism, were missing Important lectures so that they could drive trucks, 
work as clerks, or flip hamburgers in order to keep th-emselves aliveCONTINUED ON PAGE 7
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and pay the increased tuition fees. There is no man or committee to 
be aware and concerned for the schedule of each student. The need 
for a Dean of Students is becoming critical, for the students, driven 
as many are by a strong Puritan ethic, invariably imagine that they 
can stay out of debt by hard work and thus condemn themselves to over- 
extension. By the very nature of the case, it is always theological 
education, the very reason for being here, that suffers. These finan­
cial problems must be solved.’ Academic apathy cannot be conquered 
where students are forced to be overly involved in extra-curricular 
activity. The case of each student must be known and evaluated by 
someone with executive power so that the man who consistently comes 
in from an evening job at midnight and works at his desk until three 
o ’clock will be prevented from subjecting himself to such an intoler­
able schedule and will be put in a position where his drive will be 
used to accomplish outstanding academic preparation. A well published 
list of scholarships based upon clearly articulated academic qualifi­
cations should be posted to encourage students to gain financial sup­
port by academic achievement rather than academic distraction.
A second matter included under this first proposal is the limit­
ing by the Seminary of distracting field work indulged by seminarians» 
If a man is barely able to manage competence in the theological ency­
clopedia when applying all of his energy toward his required disci­
plines, it is stupid for him to take on the responsibility of a youth 
group or other activity. But if activistic student pressure is not 
countered by wise faculty counsel, the struggling seminarian invari­
ably seems to succumb to the myth that if you aren’t a Christian 
activist your soul will dry up during the seminary yeafs. The fact 
is that one must sacrifice some personal relationship to achieve the 
necessary intellectual preparation. But put even a highly rarified 
theologian in a parish and the demands of interpersonal relationship 
quickly revive his soul, if indeed it appeared to have withdrawn. But 
the revived soul will not be a weak resource little able to help the 
parishioners. On the contrary, it will be a well prepared soul of 
great inspiration. ii.My second proposal is more subtly related to the activist atmos­
phere. I propose that measures be taken to establish respect for the 
faculty and for human dignity at Puller. American churchmen should 
be at least a conservative factor in the breakdown of language, dig­
nity and etiquette of English culture rather than the avant-garde. 
Puller Seminary has attracted a remarkably fine faculty for an Evan­
gelical school; deference should certainly be paid these men. It is 
quite disgusting to hear students talk of faculty members as though 
they were peers and constantly demand that they relate as ’buddies. 
Paculty members must sacrifice personal relationship to sustain high 
levels of proficiency in their fields of specialization. Students 
can only benefit by sitting under a man who has sufficient time for 
research to enable him to remain competent in his field. The student 
therefore ought to be the ally of the faculty member in his struggle 
to retain sufficient research time rather than one who pressures for 
further dissipation of faculty time. A corollary to respect for 
ulty and for the dignity of fellow students is putting an end to the 
waste of lecture time with pedantic questions or uninformed questions 
whose answers are to be found in Encyclopediae or required texts. 
Finally, an improvement of gentlemanly manners and posture would bring 
a welcome breath of dignity to the leoture^all^hd chapel., g
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iii.
Thirdly, I propose a modification of the core curriculum. Prob­lems are becoming evident in the new curriculum.. Firstly, it has 
been observed by many that the core program makes it almost impos­
sible to transfer to or from Fuller. If this is discouraging to en­
rolled students it must form a deterrent to prospective students. 
Secondly, it appears to the student enrolled in the core program that 
some areas are having difficulty finding enough relevant material to 
fill up the time, while others are crowding almost too much into too 
short a time. Generally speaking, I propose that there are some 
areas of the core program from which busy-work could be trimmed and 
that the whole program should be brought to a uniformly high quality 
of scholarship.
Practically speaking, I would like to see several things initi­
ated. I would like to see the first two years of training become 
years of intense academic training in which the intellectual tools 
are mastered. The third year, in my opinion, should be devoted to 
•practical specialization. • In practice this would mean that the 
student would be consciously protected from distraction in the first 
two years while he attained language mastery, hermeneutical profi­
ciency, and a thorough knowledge of his Christian heritage. The 
third year should then be a true taste of the practical situation in 
which the student is to minister—  an internsh Ip while still under the 
guidance of the seminary faculty. The ’practics • courses have been 
the notoriously weak section of the curriculum. I am convinced that 
this is because of the Impossibility of teaching practical methodol­
ogy In a lecture room situation. In such courses theory constantly 
cries out for application. Therefore, in the third year men who are 
going to be evangelists should work with evangelists under seminary 
supervision; men who are to be preachers should work, not as youth 
leaders, but with ministers; missionaries should work with the type 
of mission that they intend to serve; and students headed for scholar­
ship should be allowed to continue their technical studie^,without 
distraction. The third year would be the time for strenuous activism.
All groups should now be pleased with the exception of one. I 
feel 'that It is a sad commentary on the level of appreciation of the 
relation of Christianity and culture at Fuller Seminary when students 
must take the initiative and their extra-curricular time to create 
a seminary chorus or to read literature and drama of contemporary 
Impact and discuss, their implications for a theologian. Extra­
curricular activities must be drastically curtailed. But these cul­
tural activities are too relevant for the Christian to be ignored; 
they should not be extra-curricular. ////
* * *
AUGUSTINE ON THE ORIGIN OF SIN
by Thomas B. Talbott
Probably no difficulty facing the Christian philospher is more 
profound than the problem of evil, and perhaps no one has wrestled 
more earnestly with this baffling problem than the great St. Augustine 
of Hippo. He defends the following theses: (l) Good is equatable 
with existence or being, so that everything that exists is good byCONTINUED ON PAGE 9
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definition. (2) Evil has no positive nature at all. It is merely a 
lack or absence of good. Natural evil is a deprivation residing in 
some good nature created by God, and moral evil is a defect residing 
in some good will created by God. (3) God is simple Being; that is,
He possesses nothing which He might lose. Therefore, evil is neither 
capable of harming Him nor co-eternal with Him. Absolute evil is 
nothing. (4) That which is begotten of God (Christ) is God and thus 
immutable; but that which is created out of nothing by God, since it 
participates in non-being as well as being, is necessarily mutable 
and hence corruptible. Consequently, both natural and moral evil are 
metaphysically possible in a universe created by God ex nihilo.
Such, in its simplest form, is Augustine’s general argumentative 
structure. Each point deserves considerable expansion and analysis, 
but in this paper I shall confine my attention to a single issue: 
namely, that of the origin of moral evil.
Moral evil, or sin, arises whenever a relative being willfully 
turns from the absolute Being to himself. This, Augustine labels as 
"pride," and it exists as a deficiency in the subject. But pride, 
as the abandoning of a higher good for a lower one, is not evil be­
cause the lower good is in some sense evil. On the contrary, it is 
the turning itself, and not the thing turned to, which is evil; and 
the turning is a consequence of a deficient will.
But how do we account for the first defective will? Here Augus­
tine appeals to an original misuse of freedom. Man was created with 
a free will, and a will which is morally free involves the possibil­
ity of moral rebellion. But this possibility of falling away, which 
is a necessary consequence of moral freedom, does not ifnply that in 
itself free will is evil. Free will is yet an instrumental good. It 
is the necessary precondition for man’s greatest happiness— i.e.,the 
free clinging of the will to the immutable Good.1 Moreover, its 
essence is good, but its essence is also moral freedom; and the prop­
er function of moral freedom involves both the power to cling to the 
supreme Good and the power to fall away. Therefore, it was good for 
God to create that which might fall away, for that which might fall 
away is good— good not in the sense that it is incapable of falling 
from the good, but good in the sense that this possibility of falling 
from the good is itself good.
Free will, then, is the key concept in Augustine’s handling of 
the problem of the origin of sin, but in order to render this concept 
intelligible, he must first address himself to two crucial questions: 
(l) How was it that the first bad will came to turn away from God, 
and (2) what is the relation between man’s free will and the Divine 
foreknowledge ?(l) Understandably, Augustine is not always consistent when dis­
cussing the difficult question of how a good will created by God might 
come to fall. His analysis, however, is both penetrating and con­
vincing. Rightly perceiving that there can be no efficient cause of 
an evil will, his reasoning, in my opinion, is decisive for all ages. 
The argument by which he establishes his conclusion is so rigorous 
that one dares not tamper with it.
If one seeks for the efficient cause of their /The bad i _ 
angels_^7 evil will, none is to be found. For, what can make 
the will bad when it is the will itself which makes an action 
bad? Thus, an evil will is the efficient cause of a bad ac­
tion, but there is no efficient cause of an evil will. If there is such a cause, it either has or has not a will. IfCONTINUED ON PAGE 10
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it has, then that will is either good or bad. If good, one 
would have to be foolish enough to conclude that a good will 
makes a bad will. In that case, a good will becomes the 
cause of sin— ’Which is utterly absurd. On the other hand, 
if the hypothetical cause of a bad will has itself a bad 
will, I would have to ask what made this will bad, and, to 
put an end to the inquiry: What made the first bad will 
bad? Now, the fact is that there is no first bad will that 
wa3 made bad by any other bad will— it was made bad by it­
self .3
We need not complete Augustine’s beautiful and decisive argu­
ment by reducing to absurdity the two remaining alternatives— i.e., 
that something other than will is the ultimate cause of an evil will, 
or that there exists an eternal evil will. Although Augustine’s 
attempt to refute these alternatives in terms of his Neo-Platonic 
metaphysics is not altogether satisfactory, they can gain no credence 
from'within the context of Christianity; and it is only in this con­
text that we are considering the problem of evil. Therefore, we must 
conclude that Augustine has made his point, and made it well. God is 
not the cause of an evil will, even though he grants it the power to 
turn away if it so chooses; and to look behind the decision arrived 
at by the will in its fall for a further reason why it fell is not 
only to look for something that can never be found, but is necessarily 
to think in nonsensical terms. The decision is the reason, and the 
only reason, for the choice as well as for the fall. To say that 
Adam arrived at a decision is to explain the event, and it is non­
sensical to seek to explain an explanation. Explanations explain 
events, but are not themselves explainable— otherwise they would not 
be explanations. The choice, then, has no efficient cause, and, in 
terms of Augustine’s metaphysics, becomes a "deficient" cause; that 
is, its effects are deficient and thus evil.
Unfortunately, Augustine does not always accept the implications 
of his own analysis. Sometimes his metaphysics betrays him, and some­
times he seems unable to avoid thinking in causal categories. When 
he writes, for example, that "the will itself, because it is a created 
will, wickedly and inordinately seeks the inferior being,"5 he almost 
implies that man's sin is a necessary consequence of his finitude.
This implication is reinforced by his statement that "a nature falls^ 
away from that which Is because the nature was made out of nothing.
But if man's sin is a necessary consequence of his finitude, why is 
he considered morally responsible and worthy of punishment? Again, 
how does Augustine reconcile his denial of an efficient cause of an 
evil will with his statement "that nothing happens without a preced­
ing efficient cause?"' Some causes are voluntary, of course, but the 
point about voluntary causes is that they occur without preceding 
causes. To argue, as Augustine does— (l) that there is no efficient 
cause fo a bad will; (2) that the bad angels were made bad by a bad 
will; and (3) that the reason the bad angels fell and the good angels 
did not is either that the bad angels received less grace of divine 
love or that the good angels "were increasingly aided to reach that 
plentitude of beatitude which made them certain that they would never 
fall"0— is a flagrant violation of logic. Augustine is thus on far 
safer ground when he writes that God is "the giver of all powers—  
though He is not the maker of all choices. Evil choices are not from 
Him, for they are contrary to the nature which is from Him."9
(2) Since an appeal to free will is an important part of Augus­
tine’s solution to the problem of the origin of moral evil, he must
CONTINUED ON PAGE 11
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address himself to the profound problem of the relation between human 
freedom and Divine sovereignty. If from eternity God knows before­
hand every human action, then in what sense is it meaningful to speak 
of voluntary human volitions? This question embodies the objection 
to theism raised by Cicero. God's foreknowledge, if it is genuine 
knowledge, implies that every event in the future will occur in the 
same order as it was known by God. What is worse, no event other 
than those known by God can possibly occur in the future; thus it is 
nonsensical to affirm any form of undetermined freedom. No man has 
the power to act in any manner other than that in which he does act, 
for Divine omniscience implies fatalism. As theologians, then, we 
must choose between free will and Divine omniscience. We cannot af- ■ 
firm both, for the affirmation of one is the denial of the other.
Although Augustine's attempt to meet Cicero's argument involves 
him in some of the same inconsistencies previously noted, his analy­
sis does contain the basic solution to the problem. In opposition to 
Cicero he argues that even if God is omniscient "no one sins because 
God foreknew that he would sin. ...He whose foreknowledge cannot be 
deceived foresaw, not the man's fate or fortune or what not, but that 
the man himself would be responsible."10 This argument, in my opin­
ion, Is decisive. If John chose X at t2, then it was true at ti that 
John would choose X at t2, and, therefore, God knew at t^ that John 
would choose X at t2; but God knew at ti that John would choose X at 
t2 only because it was true at t^ that John would choose X at t2, and 
it was true at tj_ that John would choose X at t2 only because, as a 
matter of fact, John did, choose X at t2. If, however, John had chosen 
Y at t2, this too would have been known by God at tj,
It does not follow, therefore, that there is no power in our 
will because God foreknew what was to be the choice in our 
will. For, He who had this foreknowledge had some foreknow­
ledge. Furthermore, if He who foresaw what was to be in our 
will foresaw, not nothing, but something, it follows that 
there is a power in our will, even though He foresaw it.XJ-
This argument of Augustine ’s can be carried a step further and 
rendered irrefutable. The object of knowledge Is truth; and since 
truth transcends all temporal, spacial relations, it is meaningless 
to attribute a time to truth. Previously we asserted that if John 
chose X at t2* it was true at ti that John chose X at t2. Such an 
assertion is misleading if It suggests that the truth that John chose 
X at t2 Is itself temporally located at ti or t2 or tn. If at ti j 
Bill asserts the statement, "At t2 John will choose X, Bill's state­
ment will, of course, be true— but eternally true. We cannot mean­
ingfully attribute ti to the truth that John chooses X at t2. As 
Professor Saunders has written:
From "'There is (either tenselessly or In any tense you like) 
a large brown cup on the table at 10 A.M. (Tuesday, July 8, 
1964)' is true," it follows that the cup is large, that it 
is brown, that it is on the table, and that all of these 
things characterize the cup at 10 A.M. What does not follow 
is that the truth that the large brown cup is on the table 
at 10 A.M. Is itself large or brown or on the table tempor­
ally located at 10 A.M. As we in fact use our language, it 
makes no more sense to attribute a time to truth than it does
to ascribe to it a size, a color, or a place.le-CONTINUED ON PAGE 12
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Strlctly speaking, then, we cannot temporally locate a truth in 
time and reason from the truth’s temporal location that a later event 
signified by the truth is inevitable. Thus, if the object of Divine 
foreknowledge is truth, then Divine foreknowledge is not inconsistent 
with human freedom, for the object of that foreknowledge (i.e. truth) 
is bound by no temporal relations (i.e. it is eternal). All we can 
say is that it is an eternal truth that John chooses X at to, and the 
eternal truth is true because John did choose X at to. Truth must 
conform to the real. No event occurs because it is true that it 
occurs, but it is true that it occurs only because it does occur.
Perhaps, however, we should return again to Augustine’s own an­
alysis. As we have already observed in connection with his discussion 
of the first evil will, he seems unable to avoid thinking solely in 
causal categories. He does reject any and all pagan notions that 
fate or fortune controls the affairs and life of man, but he yet 
pictures the world as composed of a system of causal sequences trac- 
able back to the all-powerful will of God. He further argues that 
this causal necessity, if properly understood, does not destroy free
will. . B  , ..We do not deny, of course, an order of causes in which tne
will of God is all-powerful....In His will is the supreme 
power which helps the good choices of created spirits, 
judges the evil ones, and orders all of them, giving, powers, 
to some and not to others....And absolutely all bodies are 
subject to the will of God; as, indeed, are all wills, too, 
since they have no power save what He gave them.,,.Now, if 
by necessity we mean one that is in no way in our power, but 
which has its way even when our will is opposed to-*it, as is 
the case with the necessity to die, then, our choices of liv­
ing well or ill obviously are not subject to this kind of 
necessity....On the other hand, if we take necessity to mean 
that in virtue of which something must be so and so or must 
happen in such and such a way, I do not see that we fehould 
be afraid of such necessity taking away our freedom of 
will.1? (Italics mine)
Let us not fail to notice the ambiguity in Augustine’s use of 
the word "freedom. | Earlier we alluded to the discussion in which he 
argues that free will is the solution to the problem of the origin 
of moral evil. Here his argument was that there is no cause of an evil will, and that the first bad will Vias made bad by 
itself.H But now we find him using "freedom in a different sense 
— a causal sense. According to this usage, called free 1 1
he possesses the power to act in accordance with the dictates of his 
own will, even if those dictates are ultimately caused b ,^ God* •,, . this point we only need impress that the latter kind of freedom is 
incapable of rendering man morally responsible. One is, free to define "freedom" in any way he pleases. All I ask is that 
he accept the full implication of his definition, and the B I B B  
tant consequence of all causal definitions of H g H  is ultimately the sole cause of and thus responsiole for defective
WlllSThe introduction by Augustine of the dubious analogyis unable to solve the dilemma. All defects are caused, darkness is
caused bv those conditions which prevent the penetration of lignu,
and defective wills are caused by those conditions which prevent the ana aeieciive * nrwPTNTTRD ON PAGE 13
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presence of good— conditions such as the free resolve of the will or 
perhaps the almighty will of God. Thus, I repeat, either God is not 
the cause of an evil will in which case something escapes Divine con­
trol, or God is the cause of and responsible for an evil will.
Even in his inconsistency, however, Augustine reveals an impor­
tant fact; namely that the question of the universal causality of God 
has no logical relation to the question of God’s foreknowledge. 
Whether John’s choice of X at t2 is determined or undetermined, God’s 
foreknowledge has no direct bearing on its occurrence. If John’s 
choice is caused, then, given the total circumstances in which he 
makes his choice, the cause is the sole reason for his choice. And • 
if John’s choice is uncaused, then his own decision is the sole rea­
son for his choice. We must, therefore, carefully distinguish two 
questions: (l) Does God know everything? And (2) does God cause 
everything? An affirmative answer to (l) escapes fatalism, but an 
affirmative answer to (2) does not.
Da. llbflgo arbitrio, Bk* It, Ch„ XIX*2. Ibid., Ek. Ill, Ch. I, 9-11.
3. City of God, Bk. XII, Ch. VI, p. 251.
4. To those who have never grasped the ultimate character of - 
freedom, this type of reasoning will seem foolish. (Not even Augus­
tine perceived all of its implications, although he was certainly on 
the right track.) There is, however, nothing in the slightest foolish 
about such reasoning, and we use it in other spheres of explanation 
quite often. Think of billiard ball A moving across the table and 
striking billiard ball B. Billiard ball B moves. Now i£ someone 
asks, "Why did billiard ball B move?" we properly answer, "A caused
B to move." But if we are pressed, "Why did A cause B to move?" we 
have no further answer. We might seek to explain why A moved in the 
first place (e.g.,it was caused by the cue stick), but this sheds no 
further light on the question of why A caused B given the «circum­
stance of A striking B. The point is that the statement "A caused 
B" is the explanation, and it is meaningless to seek an explanation 
for the explanation. Now, similarly, when we say, "John arrived at 
a decision to choose X," we have explained the event. We can no more 
ask why John arrived at a decision to choose X than we can ask why A 
caused B. Decision-making would not be decision-making were some 
other explanation possible.
5. Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. VI.
6. Ibid.. Bk. XIV, Ch. XIII.
7. Ibid., Bk. V, Ch. IX.
8. Ibid., Bk. XII, Ch. IX. ' . -
9. Ibid., Bk. V, Ch. IX. The view that decision-making is un­
caused because it is the consequence of freedom in operation, not 
only satisfied the demands of explanation, but it is phenomenology 
ically satisfying as well. Our experience contains many examples.
When choosing a course of action, we often do so by deciding to 
appropriate the reasons for the action. If someone asks of us why 
we walked across the street, our answer might be: "In order to get 
to the other side." If he presses us as to why we decided to walk 
on the other side, we might answer: "It is sunshinihg over here."
Now some would argue that the sight of sunshine caused a desire for 
warmth, and the desire for warmth caused the choice. This may even 
be true, but there are many times when such an explanation will not satisfy experience. If our choice were not impulsive, but determined
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by a process of deliberation by which we arrived at a decision to cross the street, 
then we can no longer explain the event in causal terms. To be sure, the desire for 
warmth does not disappear, but in the deliberation of decision-making we transcend 
the desire. If we decide to act, the warmth becomes the immediate goal at which we 
aim, and, in this sense, i t becomes the reason for, or object of, our action; but 
this goal or reason is itself appropriated by freedom, and our action is thus un­
predictable. Surely we have all experienced decision-making for which the only 
possible explanation is that after a process of deliberating we arrived at a decision. 
We may appropriate goals at which we intend to aim; but neither the goals nor any de­
sire for the goals cause the decision to appropriate the goals, even though both 
are part of the problem upon which freedom is working.
10. Ibid.. Bk. V, Ch. X.
11. Ibid.
12. John Turk Saunders, "Fatalism and Ordinary Language," The Journal of 
Phi1osophv, LXII (April 15, 1965), p. 222.
13. City of God. Bk. V, Ch. IX.
14. Loc. ci t.
Edi tor:
I am writing with regard to fellow student Eric Lemmon's recent letter in the 
Pasadena Star-News expressing his feelings about the reception given Sheriff Clark 
at his abortive lecture in our community. His disgust at the blatant violation of 
freedom of speech is legitimate. Unfortunately, he didn't stop with his one good 
point.
The logic by which Mr. Lemmon seeks to discredit two seminary professors is 
irredeemable and unworthy of a graduate student. Apparently the two professors 
were seen "in the thick of the din" even as Mr. Lemmon was "in the thick of the din." 
The professors, however, were "seemingly elated" by the events transpiring, while 
Mr. Lemmon was not. Now I submit that "seeming elation" is hardly sufficient ground 
upon which to build a cogent case that they wanted to prevent Sheriff Clark from 
speaki ng.
The fact is that we, the party of Fuller professors and seminarians wearing 
"clergy" arm-bands, were present as a Christian witness. When Mr. Clark arose to 
speak, Mr. Lemmon should have noticed that the professors, far from being elated at 
the continuing "CORE" din which prevented the lecture, sat quietly and by example 
encouraged others to likewise hear what Sheriff Clark might have to say.
I am sorry that Mr. Lemmon has chosen to attribute bad faith to his professors.
He has refused, for reasons which are his own, to take the expressed intentions of 
these professors at face value. His inference does not follow from the evidence he 
has introduced, and more importantly his evidence is factually incorrect. One wonders 
therefore, what motivating factor shaped his conclusion.
In I Cor. 6:5-6, Paul says, "I speak to your shame. Is it so, that there is 
not a wise man among you? no, not one that shall be able to judge between his 
brethren? But brother goeth to law with brother, and that before the unbelievers."
The situation of these verses is a legal one, but the underlying principle is clear: 
intra-Church issues ought not to be aired, let alone falsely aired, before the 
secular public. Mr. Lemmon might have aired his politi ca1 opinions, but he ought 
not have slanderously maligned his fellow Christians and damaged the name of an 
evangelically Christian seminary.
V/e must then surmise that the action taken by Mr. Lemmon indicates questionable 
ethics. He has made unfounded claims, used poor logic, and acted contrary to a 
pattern of action established in Holy Scripture.
Si ncerely,
David Garth
